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BOURDIEU’S CONSTRUCT OF HABITUS
AND CRITIQUE
The current sociological understanding
of habitus expressed in the work of
Pierre Bourdieu as its key academic
construct emphasizes the importance of
habits for human action. Bourdieu under-
stands human behavior as fundamen-
tally cultural; rejecting behaviorist view
of cognition and action as related to
a stimulus—response chains, the French
sociologist posits instead that human
action emanates from internalized habits
(Swartz, 2002). Bourdieu, utilizes the con-
cepts of field and habitus—the latin word
for habit- (1990/1977), to critically ana-
lyze the microsphere of society and econ-
omy elevated as habituated human action
(Bourdieu, 2005).
Bourdieu understands action as habitu-
ated, related to the unconscious reproduc-
tion of external social fields. This allows
habitus to be this foundational concept it
is in Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, exam-
ining societies as socio-economic rela-
tions and classes, rather than actors. His
emphasis on the social context’s influence
on human habits being internalized rel-
atively unconsciously is important, as it
looks to action-interaction sequences as
habituated, opposing behaviorist (Swartz,
2002) models of human action as simple
stimulus-response chains, or objectivist
accounts. Bourdieu’s habitus emphasizes
two things relevant to human action:
(a) opposing consciousness to habit(us),
which continues the modern sociological
tradition from Weber (Camic, 1986) and,
(b) the socially learnt (externally located)
nature of habit(us). A habit is viewed as an
unconscious principle of action, a deeply
internalized set of dispositions, schemas
and ways of knowing (Swartz, 2002) which
locate habits in a cultural, economic, or
social field.
In our opinion, the main problem in
Bourdieu’s view of habitus is that it largely
accounts for human action being repro-
ductive of an existing field, rather than
transformative. Because the Bourdieuian
habitus is theorized as an adopted “thrown
way of being” in the world (Akrivou and
Bradbury-Huang, 2014 forthcoming) it
blocks human freedom with social bonds,
as action is posited to emerge directly from
the internationalization of norms of rela-
tional exchange in the outside field(s) of
practice.
Our critique regarding Bourdieu’s
(quintessential) sociological habitus is that
its conception explains processes account-
ing for human behavior regulation to carry
forward existing conventions and rules,
reproductive of existing social bonds; it is
less mindful to processes of critical ques-
tioning or transformation of an existing
status quo and the role of human cog-
nition in generating action which can
interrupt and interrogate the field.
To explain our critique further, even
when Bourdieu accepts that actors can
generate new action, he understands the
“new” as habits from earlier socializa-
tion. Our main concern with Bourdieu’s
view is that looking to habitus as outside
introjection means that individual habitus
is in the best case “an active residue of
(one’s) past” (Swartz, 2002, p. 63S) which
is Bourdieu’s view! But we wish to critique
this as it theoretically misses to account for
the possibility for human freedom, which
can be appreciated by reference to other
understandings of habitus (Aristotle’s for
example).
A DIALOGICAL CONCEPTION OF
HABITUS, SUPPORTED BY
NEUROSCIENCE, AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
We believe that our critique of Bourdieu’s
habitus enables us to argue, that, in the
frame of a dialogical conception habi-
tus can be compatible with the social
basis of human freedom and learning.
Bourdieu’s habitus defines it as site of
replication of social bonds and bound-
aries, unless we revise his conception with
a generative less deterministic structure,
which protects the possibility of new habits
emerging from agency. A dialogical con-
ception understands human agency to be
simultaneously part of a field of practice
(and earlier socialization), and open to a
gradual co-creation of novel action. The
latter, emerging from an intentional con-
versational engagement practice between
acting agents, can release a new experi-
ence of in-betweeness cognition, as dialog
is a reciprocal “mode of communication
that builds mutuality through awareness
of others and as an instance of unfolding
interaction” (Eisenberg and Goodall, 1993;
Bohm, 1996; Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001,
p. 116; Ballantyne, 2004). A dialogical con-
ception of habitus can be compatible with
the social basis of human freedom and
learning, and core philosophical theories
illustrate how dialog and conversation can
gradually catalyze new habitus.
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Buber’s and Gadamer’s ethics of dia-
log are relevant to our argument. Buber
understands human freedom to emerge
from locating oneself ethically in gen-
uine relationships of a reciprocal “world
of relation” (Buber, 1970, p. 56), with
another fellow human. For Buber, the dif-
ference between “I-Thou” and “I-It” is
not in the nature of the object to which
we relate, but in the binding relation-
ship itself (Levinas, 1989; Buber, 2002).
Responding ethically to “Thou” replaces
a passive response habit, an unreflective
reproduction of external sets of relations
and previously learnt dispositions. To keep
dialogical ways of responding, one must
engage in shared reflection to how to
mindfully develop a “quality of genuine
relationship in which partners are mutu-
ally unique as whole. . . this deep bonding
is contained neither in one, nor the other,
nor in the sum of both- but becomes
really present between them” (Kramer,
2003, p. 15).
Gadamer also sees dialog as the process
fostering a gradual mutual development
of a shared gradually binding quality of
relatedness. Gadamer notes that “to con-
duct a conversation means to allow oneself
to . . . be caught up in something larger,
which is neither subjective, nor objective,
neither totally relative or fixed, . . . but . . .
a structural unity . . . being conducted by
the subject matter to which the partners in
the dialog are oriented” (Gadamer, 1965,
p. 367). Conversation partners gradually
become less preoccupied with safe habits
and engage in reaching a shared truth
(White, 1994) with regard to how to pro-
ceed in a shared quest for die Sache -or
subject matter of inquiry (Gadamer and
Lawrence, 1982; Kelly, 1988; Gadamer,
1989, p. 383). The relationship becom-
ing gradually a binding “play of persons,”
the bond being conversation itself (White,
1994).
We argue that, a dialogical concep-
tion of habitus releases human freedom.
Based on the previous analysis, engage-
ment in dialogic habitus gradually forms
a semi-autonomous zone (Akrivou and
Bradbury-Huang, 2014) of action, which
can generate new ways of knowing, while
it also converses with habitus of the out-
side field of practice. In this argument,
the idea of human freedom is meaning-
less outside the conversational practice;
instead the necessity challenges of dialogic
habitus requires to transcend the con-
ventional assumption of independently
autonomous rational agency to engage
in the conversational “structural unity”
(Gadamer, 1965; Akrivou and Bradbury-
Huang, 2014) with a specific other fel-
low human. Developing the argument here
the necessity challenges of dialogic ethics
as a way to help address the critique of
Bourdieu’s habitus.
This argument can be supported by
advances in neuroscience and psycholog-
ical theory. It may seem new to many
Westerners the idea of dyadic conver-
sational structures (an I-thou structural
unity) being the locus of conscious-
ness as the sole or primary arbiters of
social action; rather than each individual
solitary independent autonomous ratio-
nal processing (Akrivou and Bradbury-
Huang, 2014). This supports revising the
conception of human brain and cognitive
processing, opposing a human brain oper-
ating via top-down predictions about sen-
sory inputs and fully predicts the sensory
information being received (Benacer and
Murillo, 2012). Conversation is dynami-
cally releasing new shared cognition path-
ways as one gradually learns to listen,
feel, respond and engage in thought-
ful responsiveness to a specific other
actor.
The implication of such view of the
locus of social action means that each
human being bears the possibility of free-
dom (and the responsibility) to reflect
what one brings forth in the world of
relations and how. Once a dialogical
conception is present in a given social
field of action between inter-dependent
agents habitus can be compatible with the
social basis of human freedom and learn-
ing. A dialogical habitus opposes many
Western philosophical theories empha-
sis on detached, autonomous scientific
rationality. It instead supports neuro-
science research that we are endowed
with a brain adapted (Gazzaniga et al.,
2002) to parcel out reality as separable
units of an ever-changing flow of expe-
rience. We learn that solving self occurs
mainly in the prefrontal cortex, with the
emotional self-arising from the amygdala
(Lewis and Todd, 2007). Any momen-
tarily active aspects of the self-engage a
fraction of the brain’s networks (Gusnard
et al., 2001; Legrand and Ruby, 2009).
Contrary to our deeply and psychoso-
matically held belief in ourselves as “dis-
tinct individuals,” many personal aspects
happen automatically such as our heart
beating. “In effect” summarizes Hanson,
“subjectivity arises from the inherent dis-
tinction between this body and that world
(2009, p. 210).” Indeed, Koch and Tsuchiya
(2006) have found that diminishing habit-
ual self-consciousness yields more pos-
itive results for the performer. Western
neuroscience is pointing to the tanta-
lizing fact that subjectivity is a way to
structure experience but is not necessar-
ily linked to individual persona (Hanson,
2009, p. 212).
Neuroscience is also supported by
insights from human learning (Kolb,
1984; Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela
et al., 1991) and human development the-
ory (Dewey, 1929; Werner, 1948; Harvey
et al., 1961; Rogers, 1961; Schroder
et al., 1967; Loevinger, 1976; Kohlberg
and Ryncarz, 1990) on superior human
cognitive moral maturity capacity. This
is seen grounded in human freedom
to choose both to be moral and how
to engage in qualitative ways; “how”
refers to a certain quality of cogni-
tive processing which transcends sub-
jectivity and engages in fluid, mutual
inter-subjective ways of knowing (Rogers,
1961; Kegan, 1994). This quality of expe-
riencing cognition is possible once a
person freely “gives up” the safety of
one’s autonomous self-authorship on the
basis of solitary reason—an ideal of
conventional moral maturity based on
the (Piaget, 1962) theory of develop-
ment toward formal operations rely-
ing on abstract knowing (Flavell, 1963;
Loevinger, 1976).
Rather than a mechanical (mono-
logical), crystallized cognitive map already
stored in the brain in the form of abstract
schemas, enabling a purely adaptive cog-
nitive processing on the basis of habit-
uated knowing how to respond to a set
of outside stimuli, being in conversation
intervenes to change the very way a pre-
viously taken for granted form of action
can be experienced and dynamically prac-
ticed anew. Transcending its very reliance
on formal operational thinking, the pro-
cessual self emerges from within a dia-
logical habitus experiencing, an organic
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way of being complete (integrated) in
situ from within the process of narrative
relational responsiveness (Akrivou, 2008),
whereby one engages in the experience
of relating genuinely with another human
being as ground rather than a figure
(James, 1979; Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990;
Gendlin, 1997). This gradually develops a
diverse set of the brain’s cognitive path-
ways, as Bradbury- illustrates (in press)
we learn “over time, to skillfully be with
experience.”
The emergence of previously
unthought degrees of freedom gener-
ates novel action and social learning
from within conversational fields itself
rather than previously known habitu-
ated response schemas (Akrivou and
Bradbury-Huang, 2014). This idea can
be illustrated by the language of co-
emergence in enactivist theories of human
learning (Maturana and Varela, 1987;
Varela et al., 1991). A dialogic process of
narrative consciousness replaces cultural
tools, rules, conventions and language as
mechanisms for action regulation. It is
instead a dynamic view of human cog-
nition, a socially responsive brain which
intentionally self regulates itself to context
and other human beings own responses
(Lewis and Todd, 2007). This concep-
tion of habitus generates meaningful
novel action, binding one’s own con-
scious attention and other actors’ causal
intervention responses in the process of
shared conversational learning (Baker
et al., 2002).
In conclusion, in the frame of a dialog-
ical conception supported by psycholog-
ical and neuroscientific findings, habitus
can be compatible with the social basis of
human freedom and learning. A dialogical
conception of habitus may allow for habi-
tus counter-intuitive to Bourdieu (Akrivou
and Bradbury-Huang, 2014) which can
be compatible with the social basis of
human freedom and learning. It is closer to
Aristotle’s idea that rational agents (ought
to) remain conscious of which habits to
embrace and an active role of human
agents being a consequence of engaging
with virtuous habits. Perhaps, our argu-
ment helps bring Bourdieu’s habitus closer
to Aristotle’s inquiry on the significance
on human intentional action for a social
world capable for virtue.
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